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Classification and How Psychiatric
Its Risks Status Contributes to
Homelessness Policy
Anne M. Lovell
This article examines the extent to which psychiatric classification in public policy
research contributes to the equation ofhomelessness and mental illness. Surveys that
measure psychiatric status ofhomeless persons are reviewed to understand whether they
contribute to biased rates ofmental illness among homeless persons. The relationship
between psychiatric classification and the concept ofneed is examined and alternatives
to current classification are proposed. Classification is discussed particularly in relation
to policies ofsegmentation for "single" homeless adults.
Homeless? Iguess that's the category that's left over in this age of specialization.
— Resident of a municipal women's shelter, Queens, New York, 1987
The people are absolutely incapable of classifying themselves without assistance.
— G.V. Maxwell, a colonial administrator in Fiji, 1915
Injurious social phenomena exist and are even noticed without being perceived
as a social problems. 1 In fact, some may even be periodically "rediscovered."2 Yet
once they emerge as a public problem to be managed, classification becomes an
issue. For within the rationality of the modern welfare state (and of earlier systems
of charity), redistributive politics require some system of classification to indicate
eligibility for such resources as cash payments, privileges, access to services and
goods. This is the meritocratic process also known as separating the "deserving"
from the "undeserving" poor.
By now, the phenomenon of thousands of homeless men, women, and children in
the United States has gained legitimacy as a social problem. 3 And as the numbers of
persons without stable, permanent places to live have risen, so have the classifica-
tions that separate them multiplied. In fact, concern with establishing whether the
magnitude of homelessness justifies a federal response has given way to "intelligent
segmentation"4— the classification of homeless individuals into policy-relevant
groups, each of which calls for a specific service response.
Anne M. Lovell, a medical anthropologist, is research scientist, New York State Office ofMental Health, and
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New York City already provides a window on this process: more than any other
American city, it has been forced, in large part through adversarial legal processes,
to provide an extensive, if ad hoc, system of social and housing services for homeless
persons. One response to the increase in "single" adults5 seeking shelter— New
York City's municipal shelters have increased from three a decade ago to between
twenty and twenty-five today, serving up to seven thousand residents nightly— has
been to further classify shelter residents. Formally and informally, shelters are
divided along lines of age, employability, sexual preference, disability, and so forth.
Recommendations of a recent mayoral commission, aiming to revamp the city's
costly shelter policy, in fact reinforced the already existing practice of segmentation
by recommending that the large municipal shelters be replaced by smaller ones, tar-
geting specific "problem" groups (substance users, the able unemployed, the men-
tally ill, and so forth). 6 While the importance of services cannot be overemphasized,
segmentation policy's emphasis on targeting specific problems and refining cate-
gories among the homeless fails to address the underlying causes of the homeless-
ness itself. As we shall see, this classificatory practice tends to identify causes of
homelessness as well as the needs it generates with a single, salient characteristic.
Classification can thus be thought of as characterizing a second stage in the emer-
gence of homelessness as a social problem. The first stage was exemplified by the
"numbers game," in which advocates and conservative policymakers struggled over
the recognition of homelessness as a legitimate public problem. The second stage,
not unrelated to the earlier mobilization of advocates, is the plan of action for man-
aging the problem; here the larger tensions of the welfare state, between meeting
need on the one hand and disciplining, deterring, and (more recently) cutting back
costs, are expressed. The current refinement of categories of homelessness repre-
sents attempts to provide categorical resolutions to these welfare dilemmas.
In shaping homelessness as a major social problem of the 1980s and 1990s, both
public policy and popular opinion often identify the phenomenon with mental ill-
ness. Unquestionably, in the race for scarce housing, extremely vulnerable persons
who suffer from ongoing psychiatric disorders have fallen through the cracks more
easily than those who can better negotiate access to resources. Thus, they appear in
disproportionate numbers on the streets and in shelters. However, the shift in the
hegemonic view of homeless persons as shiftless, often intoxicated, vagrants (the
stereotype of post-World War II) to disorderly mentally ill cannot be explained
solely by "facts" and the characteristics of homeless persons themselves.
Some psychiatrists were aware of the appearance of psychiatrically disturbed
individuals among homeless persons as far back as the seventies. 7 For years, the
prototypical homeless person was the shopping bag lady, whose image of physical
deterioration and bizarre behavior blended with a folk notion of mental illness. Sub-
sequently, the homeless label came to group many types of poverty, whose common
denominator was a lack of housing. Yet despite clear evidence of an association
between the rise of homelessness and such economic changes as the restructuring of
the job market and the disappearance of low-income housing,8 popular representa-
tions often identify homelessness with mental illness. 9 While homeless families dom-
inate media attention, homelessness as a social problem continues to be constructed
around the idea of the "impaired capacity" of individuals, with mental illness the
central characteristic. 10 Among homeless who are mentally ill, it is often the illness
that is considered the cause of homelessness. 11
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This article, organized in three parts, is concerned with the extent to which psychi-
atric classification in public policy research contributes to the equation of homeless-
ness and mental illness. The first part discusses how studies that assess psychiatric
status of homeless persons contribute to biased rates of mental illness among home-
less persons. Next, the relationship between psychiatric classification and the con-
cept of need in public policy research about homelessness is examined. Finally, from
an applied research perspective, alternatives to classification by psychiatric status
are suggested. Similar issues of classification apply to substance abuse and other
characteristics being targeted by research and policy on homelessness, and to other
groups, such as homeless families. However, this article focuses on mental illness
and "single" homeless adults.
Does Classification Overdetermine Mental Illness?
Central to numerous government-funded surveys that count and characterize home-
less persons in the United States has been the assessment of psychiatric disorders.
Despite the range in the rates they report for mental illness, these studies present
clear evidence of considerable mental illness among homeless persons. Yet problems
in the way assessments are carried out have allowed generalizing from those studies
that show high rates of disorder to all homeless. And they have lent themselves to
the blurring of distinctions between homeless persons with severe psychiatric disor-
ders and those who are either temporarily distressed or psychologically "well."
In the last decade of research, sociologists and mental health professionals alike,
struggling to establish a "true" rate of mental illness among homeless populations,
used standards quite different from those accepted as scientifically solid in current
psychiatric and epidemiological research. For example, in the absence of mental
health assessments generated through the use of standardized instruments, they
often relied on records or the expert judgment of mental health workers, but with-
out the explicit, or standard, data-collection procedures, much like earlier genera-
tions of now critiqued psychiatric epidemiology investigations. 12
A good example of the standards these researchers and professionals used is
found in a series of published exchanges concerning whether or not mental illness
among the homeless is a myth. Snow et al. first published an article estimating an
extremely low rate among the homeless of Austin, Texas. 13 They defined people
as mentally ill if they met two of three criteria for mental illness: (1) a history of
psychiatric hospitalization, (2) reports by other homeless of extremely bizarre or
"crazy" behavior, and (3) observation by the fieldworker of behavior grossly incon-
gruent with context. (The second and third criteria have grounding in an inter-
actionist approach to the definition of mental illness, found in anthropology and
sociology).
14 Another sociologist, Wright, correctly asserted that the Texas rates are
probably lower boundaries. 15 But along with his critique, he produced another mea-
sure of mental illness that could be considered weak: an assessment based on one
contact by a trained (but unspecified) health professional. A third group of social
scientists
16 then critiqued Wright's self-selected sample— homeless persons who
come to health clinics— but also pointed out that consensus on mental illness cer-
tainly does not exist even among mental health specialists and researchers, a fact
that can be gleaned from the psychiatric literature on diagnoses that precedes every
revision of the American Psychiatric Association diagnostic manual. 17
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Among the other major types of psychiatric status indicators commonly employed
in studies of the past decade have been (1) scores on scales that measures symptoms
and/or impairment in functioning, (2) diagnoses generated from clinical evaluations
by mental health professionals, and (3) diagnoses generated from standardized clini-
cal instruments. A review of these studies 18 suggests at least three problems of
assessment that contribute to erroneous conclusions about homelessness and psychi-
atric status. These methods include how the homeless group was sampled and where
the study took place (site); the diachronic dimensions of psychiatric conditions; and
environmental contamination of measures.
In general, studies that used small, nonrandom samples at specific sites, such as
shelters for persons with psychiatric problems, reported higher rates of psychiatric
disorder. Service sites and other locales differ as to who frequent or use them, and
this "selection factor" in turn affects reported rates of mental illness. Examination
of who uses certain shelters or is to be found at a given site may explain why rates
differ. For example, schizophrenia is reported to be almost five times as high among
men 19 and older female shelter residents20 than among young homeless mothers. 21
Only a truly representative sample could overcome these problems of selection.
But representativenes of all types of homeless persons is difficult to achieve, given
the high mobility of many homeless, the difficulties in identifying "street" dwellers,
and the illusion created by one-day (or -night) cross-sectional "snapshots," and so
forth.
22 For example, one study came close to being representative of all homeless,
sheltered and unsheltered, in a given city. However, not all shelters agreed to partic-
ipate in this survey. 23 Furthermore, the methodology for contacting nonsheltered
persons consisted of targeting blocks designated by police and service providers and
approaching homeless persons in the dead of night, and in the company of police
officers. This methodology has been critiqued as undercounting the nonsheltered
homeless, especially those who might have been scared off by police or slept in areas
not identified to the researchers. 24
Other large surveys reach but a segment of the homeless population. The surveys
of New York City's municipal shelters exclude, by definition, persons staying in
family shelters, private shelters, or on the streets at the time of interview. 25 A major
Los Angeles study was limited to that city's skid row, 26 another to selected sites in
two areas of Los Angeles county. 27
The problem with biases due to site or sampling difference lies as much in the
interpretation of the study results as in the methodology chosen by the researcher.
As noted above, findings from sites with high rates of disorder have tended to fuel
the media. For example, a few years ago a New York Times article cited a local study
that showed most homeless people to be severely mentally ill. It did not point out
that the site of the study, a psychiatric emergency room, 28 would obviously draw only
people with psychiatric emergencies.
The second problem of assessment stems from the use of symptom scales and psy-
chiatric treatment histories as indicators of mental illness. When scales that measure
symptoms or distress have been used instead of psychiatric diagnoses, the rates of
distress turn out to be very high. 29 Almost half the homeless persons across all stud-
ies of the last decade score above cutoff points for "normal" populations, though the
sites are different and the instruments used vary.
One reason for such high rates involves temporality. Whereas diagnostic systems
generally build in specific duration criteria— for example, according to criteria in
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the official manual of the American Psychiatric Association, DSM III-R,™ the symp-
toms of schizophrenia must have lasted at least six months for a diagnosis to be
made— symptom scales are often anchored on the past week or some unspecified
"present." This creates confusion as to exactly what is being measured. Many scales
are measuring something very nonspecific and transitory, such as distress or demor-
alization. This interpretation contrasts with the conclusion, based on scores from
these scales, that almost half of homeless persons are mentally ill.
Demoralization, "a condition that is likely to be experienced in association with a
variety of problems . . . and perhaps conditions of social marginality as experienced
by minority groups and persons such as housewives and the poor whose social posi-
tions block them from mainstream strivings" 31 can affect all sorts of people in the
same situation— flood victims, residents of poor neighborhoods, and certainly men
and women living in crowded, unsafe shelters. Like distress, demoralization is
affected by the dimension of time in two ways. First, the symptoms can be reactive,
disappearing once someone leaves the noxious environment. Second, because the
scales themselves use differing, usually short time frames (for example, the last
week, for the widely used Center for Epidemiological Studies— Depression Scale,
or CES-D), ongoing symptoms cannot be differentiated from transient ones.
The CES-D illustrates this problem of cross-sectional versus longitudinal time
frames. The CES-D score above which subjects are considered to be "clinically"
depressed was established through epidemiological and psychiatric research because
it distinguished persons who were somewhat distressed from those who were
"normal." It may be that when applied to homeless persons, high scores on these
scales measure a reaction to the homeless situation more often than symptoms of an
illness. For example, the 1985 survey of New York City's municipal shelters showed
that first-time users of the shelter, on the average, had higher CES-D scores than
men who had been in the shelters for long periods of time. 32 This could be inter-
preted in a couple of ways. First-timers could still be suffering acute distress from
recently becoming homeless. (This interpretation is consistent with the literature on
the psychological consequences of losing a home or moving.) 33 Alternately, they
could be in "shelter shock" from the first encounter with the violent and unhealthy
environment of a city shelter. Other researchers who found very high CES-D scores
among the homeless have also interpreted these scores as signs of demoralization.34
Of course, in all these studies, persons with severe psychiatric disorders may also
score high on the CES-D.
Another temporal issue is the assumption that past characteristics are present.
This can be a problem when information on treatment history is used. Only one
indicator of psychiatric status, history of psychiatric hospitalization, is comparable
across studies, although it is probably underreported by homeless persons, especially
when they fear coercion into treatment. However, having been in treatment in the
past is not an indication of whether one is currently disturbed. An Ohio survey illus-
trated this quite well. 35 One thousand homeless persons from twenty randomly
selected counties were interviewed. Almost half of those who had been hospitalized
in the past did not report experiencing any psychiatric symptoms at the time of inter-
view. 36 Hospitalization history does not tell us much about current psychiatric status.
The last assessment problem concerns both diagnoses and symptoms. This con-
founding has been termed "the contaminating effects of external contingencies."37
The concept can be applied to conditions of homelessness that may inflate rates of
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disorder. Some aspects of a homeless person's life, like not having a regular place to
live or not holding a regular job, are part of the official psychiatric definition of cer-
tain diagnoses such as antisocial personality disorder. Thus, simply being homeless
could increase the likelihood of receiving a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder.
For example, the DSMIII-R criteria for antisocial personality disorder could
easily describe a lifestyle that represents structured arrangements in a context of
economic and other constraints, rather than reflecting the conscious violation of
others' rights. The criteria which must have been met in adulthood also appear class
bound or at least partly environmentally determined. In fact, they describe events or
reactions to conditions of the lives of many homeless— for example, significant
unemployment, repeated thefts, irritability or aggressiveness (anger), failure to plan
ahead "as indicated by travelling from place to place without a prearranged job or
clear goal for the period of travel or clear idea about when the travel could termi-
nate or lack of a fixed address for a month or more." 38
The hypothesis that rates of antisocial personality disorder are inflated by envi-
ronmental factors in the lives of homeless persons was tested empirically in the Los
Angeles skid row study. 39 When criteria that described characteristics more common
among the homeless than among a nonhomeless comparison group— not having a
regular place to live, not working for six months or more, having held more than
three jobs in the past five years— were eliminated from the definition, the percent-
age of homeless with antisocial personality disorder decreased. Lifetime prevalence
of antisocial personality disorder dropped by one-third, from 31 to 21 percent. Cur-
rent prevalence also dropped one-third, from 25 to 17 percent.
A second example of such environmental contamination concerns both diag-
nosis of depressive disorders and symptoms of depression. Having sleep disorders,
not being able to concentrate, and losing weight are symptoms of major depressive
disorders. They are also common among people who must sleep in dangerous or
uncomfortable places and depend on scavenging or handouts for food. The Los
Angeles study just cited actually found that these symptoms were not more com-
mon among depressed homeless than in domiciled comparison groups. In another
study, however, in a factor analysis of the symptom scales administered to homeless
persons with serious psychiatric disorders, symptoms of dysphoria (feeling blue,
depressed) did not correlate with sleep and appetite disturbances.40 A correlation
was expected because the latter symptoms constitute a dimension of the diagnosis of
major depression in various nosological systems.
In this section, it has been argued that surveys measuring psychiatric status among
the homeless tend to inflate rates of mental illness among them. The way study sub-
jects are sampled and the sites where the study is carried out create differences in
rates. The validity of the measures— whether they are measuring what researchers
intend them to measure— are affected by both temporality and environmental con-
tingencies. Is the validity problem inherent in the research, or does it lie in the pro-
cess by which nonresearchers interpret results? In some cases, researchers have
fallen prey to generalizing findings based on studies of specific sites to most home-
less people. Other researchers are more conservative in interpreting their measures.
Still others use a combination of measures to indicate psychiatric status, such as a
composite of symptom scale scores, interviewer ratings, and psychiatric hospital his-
tory. However, media reports tend to concentrate on high rates with little interpreta-
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tion. In this perhaps unintended sense, psychiatric classification in surveys of the
mentally ill overdetermines mental illness among the homeless.
Psychiatric Status as a Construction of Need
Earlier, it was suggested that classification takes on importance when the emergence
of a social problem reaches the stage where discussion, advocacy, and other tactics
force action. The action can be seen in the ensemble of policies, plans, and pro-
grams that develop around homelessness. How does psychiatric classification of
homeless persons affect these actions?
A rational assumption might be that such classification provides a database for
active policy. In this process, psychiatric status comes to stand for the need for
mental health services. Then, if psychiatric classification has inflated rates of psychi-
atric disorder among the homeless, public policy must concern itself with managing
large numbers of psychiatrically disabled persons. This view can be challenged on
both an empirical and a conceptual basis.
Mental health policy for homeless persons in New York State over the past
decade and a half belies a one-to-one relationship between psychiatric status as an
indicator of need and the development and provision of services. Hopper has shown
how data concerning the presence of psychiatrically disturbed individuals among
homeless persons existed prior to any official responses to the problem. 41 In the early
1980s, although State Office of Mental Health bulletins reported a high number of
shelter residents assessed as needing mental health services, state officials publicly
disavowed high rates of psychiatric disorders among the homeless. 42 As Hopper
explains, any acceptance of such a rate would have been tantamount to acknowledg-
ing the failure of deinstitutionalization. When a state-commissioned random study
of shelter residents found 33 percent to have histories of previous psychiatric hospi-
talization, it argued that, given the time lag between change in hospital policy and
the appearance of homelessness, deinstitutionalization could not explain the pres-
ence of mentally ill homeless persons. 43 A similar argument was presented in studies
commissioned by state offices of mental health in Ohio44 and Michigan. 45 In New
York, the Office of Mental Health also refused a primary responsibility for basic
material needs of homeless mentally ill in its 1981 five-year plan, although subse-
quently it went on to provide some housing for them.46
In the late 1980s, New York City's roundup of mentally ill homeless from the
streets provided another illustration of the distance between research findings and
policy. This action, the so-called Koch Plan, was carried forth even though, from
the very beginning, city as well as state mental health officials declared that the men-
tal health system did not have the beds to accommodate more patients. In fact,
the heart of the plan— an extension of the state mental hygiene law to allow, as
grounds for involuntary hospitalization, behavior patterns suggesting that persons
might harm themselves in a foreseeable future— was articulated by the mayor as
early as 1981, when the city administration attempted to absolve itself of respon-
sibility for sheltering the homeless. The plan itself affected only a small number of
people and is focused on emergency and acute services, not long-term supports. The
plan also aimed to pressure the state into providing more facilities for the mentally
ill homeless, perpetuating the old state-city struggle over responsibility for the
homeless that began in 1980. 47
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If a major goal lay behind the policy, it may have been linked more to the eco-
nomics of postindustrial cities than to psychiatric problems conceived of as needs.
The plan targeted Manhattan from 110th Street on the Upper West Side and 96th
Street on the Upper East Side to downtown Manhattan, although there is no hard
evidence that the most severely mentally ill frequent only those areas. These are,
however, prime areas for real estate and tourism. The tension between ejecting dis-
turbing individuals from public space, or treatment for the sake of "aesthetics," and
legitimate treatment for a psychiatric disorder runs through the court case of Joyce
Brown, the homeless woman forcibly removed, under the policy, from the East Side
sidewalk where she resided. Alternately described as dirty, disheveled, malodorous,
delusional, acutely psychotic, possibly suffering from lupus cerebritis (a degenerative
disease that can affect brain functioning), possibly suffering from schizophrenia or a
severe affective disorder, and, in her words, "a professional street person, though
not a career street person,"48 Brown's psychiatric classification was never clear. If she
is a symbol of the policy by which she was hospitalized involuntarily, then her case
suggests that psychiatric classification bears little direct relation to policy. The "aes-
thetic" approach, a reflection of land value and transformation, 49 characterized ear-
lier practices of hospitalizing homeless mentally ill individuals.50 It was also a major
reason for funding many skid row studies in the fifties and sixties. At that time,
though, alcoholism, not mental illness, provided a rationale for treatment, which
often amounted to removal of skid row men from urban renewal areas and central
business districts.
In social policy research, the concept of need takes on a universal quality, as if
it were a clear, objective phenomenon that could be attributed to the individual
recipient or potential recipient of services. An alternative approach interprets need
as a socially constructed reality that, in policy research, serves as a guide for design-
ing and planning services and for the functioning of organization. In his analysis
of British social welfare research, which is applicable to the United States as well,
Smith identified numerous variables that are represented by "needs," such as
agency-determined eligibility for resources, expressed need of individuals for a
resource, needs assessed by researchers. 51 What concept then, lies behind using
mental health status as a major variable in surveys of the homeless?
The studies reviewed earlier suggest a multiplicity of constructed needs, as we
will see. In fact, the needs assumed by using rates of psychiatric disorder or distress
do not coincide with the needs expressed by homeless persons themselves. By now,
enough surveys have established the consistent finding that homeless persons do not
necessarily express a need for the mental health resources service providers and
researchers assess them as needing. They also order their needs quite differently
from the way professionals do.
The 1985 survey of New York City municipal shelters illustrates this point.52 Both
clients and interviewers were asked to rate needs for services in twenty different
areas of living. The largest discrepancy between client and interviewer judgment was
in need for help with health and emotional problems. Interviewers judged that 52
percent of the clients needed these services, yet less than half (23%) of the clients
reported that this type of service could improve their quality of life. Other large dis-
crepancies were found in the areas of getting along with family, improving job skills,
health and medical problems, drinking problems, drug problems, and improving
interpersonal relations.
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These findings are in keeping with the observations in a San Francisco study.53 It
found that the hierarchy of needs expressed by homeless users of psychiatric services
in the downtown area did not correspond to the services that mental health profes-
sionals made available to them. Although the homeless persons interviewed had
two or more voluntary contacts with acute or emergency psychiatric services in the
two months preceding the interviews, the frequency with which they rated mental
health resources as a need was much lower than those for housing, entitlements, or
employment.
A study of service utilization and preference patterns of homeless persons at three
sites in Boston— a shelter and treatment program for homeless persons who are
also mentally ill and two publicly funded shelters— came to similar conclusions. 54
Help with housing, food or food stamps, job seeking, obtaining clothing, and bene-
fits applications were needs homeless persons cited most frequently. The majority
of the homeless persons interviewed had not sought mental health services in the
six months preceding the interview, nor did they cite a need for such services. The
authors state that "this is interesting in light of the fact that the interviewers, all of
whom were experienced mental health workers, rated the majority of respondents
from all groups as being in need of mental health services."55
Other studies illustrate the priority homeless persons give to material needs and
the differences between goals set by social workers and those acceptable to home-
less persons with psychiatric disorders.55 One of the first evaluations of innovative
service programs for homeless mentally ill individuals found that client disagree-
ment over housing goals had a significant negative effect on the likelihood that the
client would remain in housing once it was obtained. The authors write that "hous-
ing 'placements' sometimes came undone if programs did not ensure that the pro-
cess of setting and pursuing service goals incorporated clients' own perspectives on
their needs and options."57
What accounts for such wide discrepancies between the need constructed by
homeless persons and need constructed by researchers and service providers? Mul-
kern and Bradley point out that those homeless persons who attempted to obtain
mental health services were by and large able to, "suggesting that accessibility to
mental health care may not be a barrier for homeless persons, but acceptability may
be."58 Public psychiatric services, of course, are not readily accessible in New York
City and other areas of the United States for all who desire them, judging by the
long waits in emergency rooms. However, regardless of supply, many former and
occasional patients who have not consistently been part of the mental health
"system" and who are not necessarily homeless express a similar reluctance to
accept treatment.59 Others desire treatment, but not the medication and constraints
offered. 60 Fifteen years after mental illness was "discovered" among homeless per-
sons, this response continues to be one of the most persistent themes in services for
mentally ill homeless.
Relative disinterest in mental health services may reflect the greater need for
material resources or prior negative treatment experiences. It may also reveal a lack
of insight or awareness of a mental health problem. However, rather than interpret-
ing homeless persons' reluctance in seeking or accepting mental health services on
the basis of a universal notion of need, we might do well to view such expression of
autonomy as a critical consciousness of the situation. The low priority they give to
psychiatric care may reflect conflicts between the value systems of two worlds61 or
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dislike or inability to tolerate the rigidity of organizational structure and time,62
as well as the centrality of basic needs for shelter, food, and so forth. Refusing to
"hear" such needs has adverse effects on service planning and may lead to extreme
consequences, such as creating absolute and meaningless (as suggested above)
categories of mentally ill homeless. Rather than interpreting the expression of
non-mental health needs as resistance, the context in which they are voiced should
be examined. This points to the way mental health services are organized, the multi-
plicity of agencies a homeless person must deal with, and the continual shrinking of
resources. Furthermore, programs that meet homeless persons at the point where
they are do exist; examples include "low-demand, no-questions-asked" approaches,
as well as services that emphasize engagement and trust building as precedents to
intervention or involve clients in management, 63 such as the Heights Residence in
New York City, Women of Hope in Philadelphia, and a number of consumer-run
alternatives, such as the Independence Support Center in Oakland.
On empirical grounds, then, we can question that the mental health needs identi-
fied in surveys affect policy directly. However, the very concept of need that under-
lies this policy research can also be challenged. Using psychiatric status as an indica-
tor of need presents a further danger. It promotes a circularity by which the supply
defines the demand. That is, by defining the needs of homeless persons in terms of
psychiatric dimensions and symptoms, the service itself— hospitalization or treat-
ment— becomes the social goal. This circularity in turn legitimates and reinforces
the existing system (or nonsystem) of services64 while preempting the possibility of
other types of responses. It also removes from the universe of discourse (social
policy) any indication of the macro-level changes that create and affect the day-to-
day situation of homeless persons.
Alternative Classifications and Alternatives
to Classification
The circularity created by constructing need through psychiatric status parallels the
equation of homelessness and mental illness. In fact, it amounts to a "psychiatriza-
tion" of a social problem. Using single signifiers to cover the multiple problems of
poor people is, of course, not new in American welfare history. In the two earlier
major crises of the United States in this century, the thirties and the sixties, the pat-
tern of intervention was similar: individualizing cases, categorizing and isolating the
poor, multiplying the agencies distributing aid, with the effect of denying that
poverty is a social and political problem. In this approach, social problems are
increasingly turned into psychological ones, by redefining them as problems of indi-
vidual pathology and deflecting attention from their fundamental social, economic,
and political causes. 65 While psychiatry plays a role in this process, it takes place
regardless of the formal involvement of psychiatrists, as some concurrence exists
between the culture of psychiatric professionals and the hegemonic values of Ameri-
can culture.
Is there an alternative to classification by psychiatric status that might break
the circularity described? The question begs consideration both because classifica-
tion is inevitable at this stage in the emergence of homelessness as a social problem
and because the fact that some homeless persons suffer from severe psychiatric
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conditions requires responses as immediate as that of housing for homeless persons
in general.
A first suggestion would involve shifting emphasis from a static characteristic to
the resources one has for negotiating the experiences of everyday living, or survival.
For some time now, psychiatrists and researchers have been questioning the useful-
ness of a psychiatric diagnosis for treatment purposes. Diagnosis neither provides
knowledge of the context of distress or illness nor suggests which types of treatment
are preferable.
66 Perhaps the one exception to this statement is a primary diagnosis
of substance abuse or a dual diagnosis of substance abuse and psychiatric disorder.
In fact, such diagnoses make getting into treatment harder, because the individuals
fall between two treatment systems and bodies of knowledge. The substance-abuse
label also makes it less likely to obtain other resources, such as housing.
Psychiatric research suggests that symptoms and diagnosis may not be the most
useful predictor of who will be referred to what service or of who does best where.
Instead, both stressful experiences in an individual's life and how well he or she had
been able to negotiate everyday life (for example, work, social relations) may be
more useful in suggesting the intervention that should be made available and the
results that could be expected.
Among persons with schizophrenic disorders, for example, future behavior has
been shown to be predicted best not by symptoms but by past behavior in the same
outcome domain, such as employment. 67 A study that examined a wide range of psy-
chiatric disorders found that the decision to hospitalize rather than refer to outpa-
tient treatment is most highly correlated with current adaptive functioning. 68
These study results confirm what clinicians have long observed— in their lan-
guage, that stress and level of functioning are important predictors of a need for
treatment. In what is almost a research cliche, two leading researchers who are
attempting to unravel the "nature" of the course of schizophrenia showed that the
social competence a person diagnosed as schizophrenic demonstrates before onset
of the illness is his or her best prognostic indicator. 69 People may be impaired in
some areas (symptoms) but not others (ability to work). These researchers also con-
ceptualize separate systems of functioning. We might reinterpret these as domains
of everyday life which one is able to negotiate: treatment, social relations with
others, obtaining and retaining resources, and so on. While these are clearly interre-
lated in an individual's concrete lived reality, past performance predicts future per-
formance in the same domain: past hospitalization predicts future hospitalization,
past employment predicts future employment, and so forth.
In an attempt to clarify the concept of chronicity in mental illness, Bachrach raised
the question of whether it refers to active symptoms or to functional disabilities.™
This clarification is important given the assumption that it is chronically mentally ill
homeless persons who are most in need of services. 71 Symptoms of illness may be pres-
ent without disability, as we saw above. Similarly, difficulty in day-to-day functioning
may persist long after primary symptoms of the illness have disappeared. Some
aspects of that disability, as Estroff's ethnography of patients living in community-
based settings suggests, 72 are produced by social interaction with people and organiza-
tions, as well as by the experience of illness, and may persist without the illness.
Evidence from research concerning homeless persons with psychiatric problems
adds further grist in suggesting that competence in everyday life, or so-called level of
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functioning, is more predictive than symptoms or diagnosis— with the exception,
again, of substance abuse. In an evaluation of programs for mentally ill homeless,
two aspects of competence— personal care and community skills— predicted who
got into housing within a six-month period. In the 1987 New York City municipal
shelter survey, level of functioning also predicted the interviewers' rating of type of
housing a homeless client needed. 73 These ratings were part of a needs assessment
made by the interviewers after they had spent, on the average, an hour and twenty
minutes asking questions about demographic background, residential history,
mental health, health, substance abuse, and other client characteristics. Interviewers
were asked to place clients' housing needs on a continuum, ranging from indepen-
dent housing to partly supervised housing to inpatient treatment. An interviewer's
evaluation of client's competence, a client's ability to function, contributed more to
the rating than did such mental health indicators as client's self-reported depressed
mood and psychotic ideation, interviewer's rating of psychotic behavior, or history of
psychiatric hospitalization.
Although measures of adaptive functioning may be preferable to measures of psy-
chiatric status for social policy research, level of functioning presents its own sets of
problems. First, level of functioning does not escape thorny issues of validity. A
major problem in using level-of-functioning rating scales concerns the contaminat-
ing effects of environmental contingencies, which were discussed in relation to psy-
chiatric symptoms. Several studies of homeless persons have noted the confounding
of poor functioning with adaptation to a hostile or resourceless environment. 74
Among the direct effects of environment are dangerous or noisome conditions that
affect sleep and concentration; food retrieved from garbage, or donated or rou-
tinized meals that affect ability to eat nutritiously; overcrowded and violent shelter
conditions; and danger of physical or sexual assault or theft in the streets, which
affect interpersonal relations.
Finally, level of functioning resembles too closely another administrative category,
disability, that plays a large role in the distributive politics mentioned earlier. 75 As
Stone later demonstrated for categories of policy research, the level-of-functioning
measures, when isolated, emphasize one characteristic at the exclusion of others that
may be equally as important. 76 In this metaphorical process, level of functioning, or
its inverse, disability, becomes a symbol, as does psychiatric status. As such, it is both
ambiguous and elastic, shaped by political agendas and economic priorities. In the
Social Security Administration's recertification policy in the early 1980s, thousands
of individuals were thrown off the Supplementary Security Income rolls as the inca-
pacity to work was narrowly defined by the presence of symptoms.
To these elements of classification should be added two other types of indicators.
A truly social, rather than psychiatric, "diagnosis" should include some signs of the
community or network to which an individual has been attached. Becoming home-
less happens in a social context, and disaffiliation from major social institutions does
not necessarily mean detachment from other human beings. 77 Second, needs articu-
lated by homeless persons themselves must be incorporated into their classification.
Many surveys, as was shown above, contain this information. However, in diffusing
findings, each element is broken up and isolated from the other, thus reflecting only
a fragment of the lived experience of the individuals described. In this process psy-
chiatric status tends to take on disproportionate importance.
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An alternate to classification can take place to the stage of developing a plan of
action. Needs can be articulated at several levels. The examples presented thus far
focused on the individual level. Collective expressions of needs can emerge in a dia-
logue among potential clients, on the one hand, and advocates, service providers,
and planners, on the other. In the field of mental health, some examples exist of the
organization of services and resources that evolve as needs are brought to aware-
ness, are redefined, or change. Bachrach described this process in idiosyncratic pro-
grams for new types of mental health consumers. 78 Other examples are evident in the
democratic psychiatry movement in Italy 79 and in recent experiences such as psychi-
atric consumer-run housing and drop-in centers. The action-research of European
poverty programs and of earlier periods in the United States formalize some of
these practices.
Finally, needs may be articulated through collective actions. This is the case with
Union of the Homeless's taking over of empty public housing and with the home-
steading movement in New York City and elsewhere. Psychiatrically vulnerable
homeless persons, while not figuring prominently, have nevertheless been involved
in collective ventures such as living in abandoned buildings or shantytowns.
Whether an alternative classification or an alternative to classification is devel-
oped, we can conclude that psychiatric classification is overinterpreted. As shown,
classification efforts too often serve the desire of administrations to define home-
lessness as someone else's problem or to meet the needs of other interest groups.
These same measures and categorical schemes will not allow us to answer disparate
but crucial questions about whether homelessness is due to personal or societal fail-
ings, which governmental agencies contribute to it, what agencies are responsible for
responding to it, and what specific approaches are needed to change the situation,
regardless of its causes. $*-
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